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LANGVILLE v. LANGVILLE
NON-RESIDENT ATTACHMENT FOR
OVERDUE SUPPORT PAYMENTS
Langville v. Langville'
On April 20, 19,43, the Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore
City entered a decree divorcing the parties a vinculo matri-
monii, awarding custody of their minor child to the wife,
and ordering the defendant husband to pay certain sums
of money to the plaintiff, including weekly payments of
$8.00 for the support of the child until she became self-sup-
porting, "subject to the further order of the court". The
decree embodied provisions for these payments in accord-
ance with the terms of an earlier stipulation agreement.
After the defendant's prolonged default, the plaintiff
commenced in Anne Arundel County a non-resident at-
tachment proceeding under Code Article 9, Section 2, on
January 23, 1947 to recover the unpaid sums under the de-
cree. Under the writ, the sheriff attached a motorboat in
the possession of the debtor's father, who was made gar-
nishee. A copy of the short note was mailed to the defen-
dant in Washington, D. C., and, in conformity with the es-
tablished practice, a separate action was docketed against
the garnishee. 2 Neither the defendant nor the garnishee
filed any pleas. The court granted the plaintiff's motion for
a judgment of condemnation nisi, and, after her waiver of
a jury trial, found a verdict against the defendant for the
amount of the claim, with interest and costs. No judgment
was ever entered on the verdict, the clerk issued a writ of
fieri facias, and the sheriff made a levy thereunder.
Subsequently, the plaintiff wife filed a petition alleging
that the garnishee and the defendant's brother had filed
boat liens against the attached chattel two weeks after the
sheriff's levy under the writ of fleri facias. She further
averred that these liens were invalid and fraudulent as to
her, and she prayed that they be stricken from the docket
and that the execution sale be made free and clear of these
encumbrances. In their answers, the lienors alleged that
their liens were bona flde and valid. At the hearing on the
petition and answers, the trial judge examined the boat
1 60 A. 2d 206 (Md. 1948).
22 POE, PLEADING AND PRACTICE (Tiffany's ed. 1925), Sec. 694, and cases
there cited. The effect of the attachment was to place the boat in cuatodia
Zegis, a position supported by the earliest Maryland authorities; see Glenn
v. Gill, 2 Md. 1, 18 (1852) ; Hodge v. McLame, Tke Law of Attachmont in
Maryland, Sec. 148.
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liens, without passing upon their validity, and all of the
papers filed in the attachment proceeding. The Circuit
Court for Anne Arundel County then held, upon its own
motion, that it lacked jurisdiction over this non-resident
attachment based upon the decree of the Circuit Court No.
2 of Baltimore City. The court quashed the attachment
and the writ of fieri facias, and, from this order, the plain-
tiff appealed.
In a unanimous decision, the Court of Appeals, assum-
ing without deciding that the question presented by the
appeal was one of jurisdiction over the subject matter
rather than of venue, held that the trial court erred in its
determination that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the
attachment proceeding.
The case raises two problems which merit considera-
tion: first, the manner of enforcement of a domestic, equi-
table decree for the support of a minor child, and, second,
the technicalities of the non-resident attachment procedure
with particular reference to those which required correc-
tion in this proceeding.
The fundamental rule of this case is that an equitable
decree of a Maryland court for the periodic payment of
fixed sums of money for the support of a minor is enforce-
able in this State against a non-resident defendant under
Code Article 9, Section 2, without the necessity of seeking
any further relief from a court of equity. In so deciding,
the court, however, refused to commit itself definitely to
the proposition that the equity court which rendered this
decree could not enforce it against a defendant who had
left the State, although the court was doubtful whether
the plaintiff could obtain any additional relief in equity
until the decree was converted into a money decree. With
reference to the existence of other possible remedies,
Judge Henderson, speaking for the Court of Appeals, said:
"Whether the Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City
retained jurisdiction of the non-resident defendant so
as to permit the entry of a money decree in personam,
against him, or whether any other remedy, by way of
sequestration, execution or otherwise, . . . would be
available under section 211 [Code Article 16-author's
note], are questions we need not now consider." 3
Where a divorce decree contains a provision requiring
payments for the support of the parties' minor children, it
s Supra, n. 1, pp. 209-210.
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is generally considered that such an order is as enforce-
able by contempt proceedings as an order for the payment
of alimony for the support of the wife.4 In some jurisdic-
tions, including Maryland, however, support orders for
children cannot be enforced by this remedy.' The court in
the Langville case stated that the decree, while not one
for a liquidated sum of money, created a debt of record
rather than an obligation to pay alimony.6
Since the decree was not a money decree, the court was
of the opinion that:
"Before execution could be had upon it, further
proceedings would be appropriate, under the estab-
lished practice, 'for the purpose of converting overdue
installments under the original decree into a lump sum
so as to become a lien upon the property of the defen-
dant and to facilitate execution or other action under
'Section 211, Art. 16 of the Code'."7
'154 A. L. R. 443, 469-470.5 Bushman v. Bushman, 157 Md. 166, 145 A. 488 (1929). In this case, both
the agreement of the parties and the divorce decree contained independent
provisions in separate paragraphs for alimony for the wife and a stipulated
annual sum, payable in monthly installments, for the maintenance and sup-
port of the parties' children. The court held that that part of the decree
directing payments for the support of the children was unenforceable by
imprisonment for contempt. In Knabe v. Knabe, 176 Md. 606, 6 A. 2d 366,
124 A. L. R. 1317 (1939), the decree, after several modifications by the
court, required the husband to pay a weekly sum to the wife "for her sup-
port and maintenance and for the support and maintenance of the minor
children". The modified order was construed as one for alimony alone,
because it was impossible to allocate the single income equitably between
the wife and the children. The court held, therefore, that it was enforceable
by contempt proceedings.6 In Bushman v. Bushman, supra, n. 5, 171, the court had earlier said:
"The failure of the defendant to pay as decreed the plaintiff the
specified annual sum for the support of the children, and to discharge
his other pecuniary obligations in their regard, is not a declination to
pay alimony but a refusal to comply with those terms of the decree
which imposed upon the defendant an obligation in the nature of a
debt. So that part of the decree relating to the support of the children
is within the protection of the constitutional inhibition against imprison-
ment for debt, and obedience to this part of the decree cannot be en-
forced by imprisonment for contempt of court."
'Supra, n. 1, 209, citing Leberstein v. Leberstein, 186 Md. 25. 26, 45 A.
2d 753 (1946). In Marshall v. Marshall, 164 Md. 107, 163 A. 874 (1933), the
divorce decree, which incorporated an earlier agreement of the parties,
ordered the defendant husband to pay to the plaintiff the sum of $50 per
month, until her "death or remarriage", "for the support and maintenance
of herself and the care, education, maintenance and support" of their
children. The decree was not for alimony. At page 116, the court said:
"The judgments and decrees contemplated by that statute [then
Article 26, Section 20; now Section 21] are those which may survive the
death or marriage of the person for whose benefit they were originally
entered. Preliminary to an execution on a decree like the one now under
consideration, a proceeding to ascertain the amount of the unpaid In-
stallments, and the existence of the conditions upon which Its enforce-
1950]
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In a few states, the rule is otherwise, so that installment
payments decreed for the support of the minor children of
the parties become, when due, final judgments, on which
execution may be issued, and this result is reached either
with or without the aid of a statute.' According to the
view prevailing in most jurisdictions, the statute of limita-
tions begins to run against each such installment from the
date on which it accrues. 9
Earlier cases had shown in Maryland that any arrearage
due under the decree must be ascertained as a liquidated
sum before the issuance of execution. In the Marshall
case,'" the defendant husband began to make the required
$50 monthly payments to the plaintiff, "for the support
and maintenance of herself and the care, education. main-
tenance and support" of their minor children. Several
years later, he removed from Maryland and became un-
able to comply with the terms of the decree. More than
twenty-six years after the entry of the original decree, the
court passed an order which liquidated the amount of the
arrearage due and directed execution. Thereupon, the
plaintiff caused the issuance of an attachment of a valuable
personal estate which had become distributable in Balti-
more to the absent defendant. The lower court, which had
rescinded the order directing execution and had quashed
the attachment, was reversed by the Court of Appeals.
In Leberstein v. Leberstein," the divorce decree awarded
to the wife ordered the defendant to pay the sum of $8 per
week for the maintenance and support of their minor child.
Almost nineteen years later, the plaintiff filed a petition
in the case reciting the decree, alleging that under it an
unpaid balance of $5,571. was due, and praying for a judg-
ment is dependent, would be essential. That course was followed in the
present case. Until the passage of an order determining the amount due
and authorizing execution, the decree would not become a lien on the
defendants' property, but would only have the effect of an adjudication
of liabilities thereafter maturing at stated periods. Upon a proper peti-
tion and order such a decree may be enforced by execution or attach-
ment as to all unpaid installments which may have become due within
the preceding twelve years."
8 McKee v. McKee, 154 Kans. 340, 118 P. 2d 544, 137 A. L. R. 880 (1941)
Trunkey v. Johnson, 154 Kans. 724, 121 P. 2d 247, 250 (1942); Doak v.
Doak, 187 Oki. 507, 104 P. 2d 563, 566 (1940). In the following cases, execu-
tion was Issued pursuant to a statute: Shields v. Shields, 55 Cal. App. 2d
579, 130 P. 2d 982, 983-984 (1942); Cochrane v. Cochrane, 57 Cal. App. 2d
937, 135 P. 2d 714, 715-716 (1943) ; Wellman v. Wellman, 305 Mich. 365, 9
N. W. 2d 579, 582 (1943) ; Stephens v. Stephens et al., 170 Or. 363, 132 P. 2d
992, 993-994 (1943).
9 137 A. L. R. 890; Markhall v. Marshall, supra, n. 7, 115-116.
11 Supra, n. 7.
2
1 Supra, n. 7.
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ment in that amount. The Court of Appeals held that an
appeal would not lie from the interlocutory order of the
lower court overruling the defendant's demurrer and said
that the purpose of the proceeding was to reduce the sum
of the accrued installments, due under the original decree,
to a fixed amount which would constitute a lien on the de-
fendant's property "and to facilitate execution or other
action under Section 211, Article 16 of the Code, 1939. "12
In both the Marshall and Leberstein cases, the amount due
and unpaid under the decree was converted into a lump
sum in a proceeding before the original equity court. In
the instant case, however, the same result was obtained by
a non-resident attachment proceeding at law.
As to the second point mentioned above, the Court of
Appeals pointed out that there were several irregularities
in the attachment proceeding. The law 13 requires that "at
the time of making the affidavit, the creditor shall produce
the bond, account, or other evidence of debt, by which the
... debtor is so indebted; . . .". As used in the statutes
governing attachments, the term "indebted" has generally
not been construed in a technical or strict legal sense. 4
At the time of making her affidavit, the plaintiff was not
bound to produce either testimony qua testimony, or all
the evidence which she might adduce in court to establish
her claim and to entitle her to a judgment of condemna-
tion,"3 but the account and voucher produced must, how-
ever, show on their face a prima facie indebtedness of the
defendant to the plaintiff. 6 The production of a copy of
the equitable decree satisfied this requirement in the in-
stant case. Although the narr. recited that the plaintiff's
claim was "itemized in voucher in short note attached
hereto and made a part hereof," and the plaintiff contended
that a voucher was in fact filed with the other papers, the
clerk denied that the plaintiff had filed a voucher and re-
fused to insert in the record a purported copy. The Court
of Appeals said that the absence of a voucher was not a
fatal defect, but that it could be cured either by amend-
ment 7 or by verdict. 8
-Ibid., 26.
2 Md. Code (1939), Art. 9, Sec. 4.
14 Franklin v. Claflin, 49 Md. 24, 38 (1878) ; Wilson v. Wilson, 8 Gill 192,
194 (1849).
"White v. Solomonsky, 30 Md. 585, 589 (1869).
" Hough v. Kugler, 36 Md. 186, 194 (1872) ; Mears v. Adreon, 31 Md. 229,
238 (1869).
1Morgan v. Toot, 182 Md. 601, 611, 35 A. 2d 641 (1944), cited by the court,
Involved alleged Insufficiency of the vouchers rather than a complete ommis-
sion of them. It would seem, therefore, that the holding of the present case
19501
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While it has generally been held that, since attachment
proceedings are purely legislative creations, they must on
their face disclose a substantial, as distinguished from a
literal, compliance with statutory requirements, 19 the court
here decided that the errors were procedural, and not
jurisdictional. Since no judgment was ever entered on the
verdict found for the plaintiff by the trial court sitting
without a jury, it necessarily follows that the writ of
fieri facias was prematurely issued.
In reversing and remanding the case to permit the plain-
tiff to make any requisite amendments and to file what-
ever motions might be necessary, the Court of Appeals
recognized that the General Assembly enacted the broad
provisions for amendment "so that all attachment cases
may be tried on their real merits and the purposes of jus-
tice subserved; ...".20
in this particular goes further than the earlier decision on which the court
relied. While Md. Code (1939), Art. 9, Sec. 28, does not in express terms
authorize the procedure here sanctioned by the court, the result may be sup-
ported on the ground that it is within the intention of the legislature as
declared in the statute itself.
In Sugar Products Co. v. Kitzmiller, 137 Md. 647, 653, 113 A. 345 (1921),
cited by the court, it appeared that the contract by which the defendant was
allegedly indebted was not annexed to the account or vouchers filed with the
affidavit. It was held that such a defect could be cured before verdict by
amendment, but that the failure to produce the contract could not be raised
on motion to quash after verdict.
19 Gill v. Physicians & Surgeons' Bldg., etc., 153 Md. 394, 405, 138 A. 674
(1927) ; Coward v. Dillinger, 56 Md. 59, 60-61 (1881) ; Rvesson v. Selby, 32
Md. 340, 345-346 (1870) ; Mears v. Adreon, supra, n. 16, 237-238; White v.
Solomonsky, supra, n. 15, 588; Matthews v. Dare, 20 Md. 248, 264 (1863) ;
McPherson v. Snowden, 19 Md. 197, 233 (1862); Risewick v. Davis, 19 Md.
82, 91 (1862) ; Brown v. Somerville, 8 Md. 444, 460-461 (1855) ; Boarman v.
Patterson, 1 Gill 372, 381 (1843) ; Shivers v. Wilson, 5 Har. & J. 130, 132
(1820).
2*Md. Code (1939), Art. 9, See. 28.
